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organizations	 (FIGOs).	 While	 IIGOs	 are	 composed	 of	 national	 governments	 and	 thus	 resemble	 FIGOs	
except	 for	 their	 informal	organizational	 structure,	 TGIs	 include	a	 variety	of	different	members	 ranging	
from	 private	 firms,	 over	 non-governmental	 organizations	 (NGOs),	 to	 governments	 at	 various	 levels.2	




the	 substantial	 rise	 of	 informality	 in	 world	 politics	 both	 within	 and	 outside	 of	 existing	 formal	
organizations.		




The	 specific	 issue	 area	 considered	here	 is	 international	 climate	policy.	 The	United	Nations	 Framework	
Convention	 on	 Climate	 Change	 (UNFCCC)	 provides	 the	 formal	 organizational	 structure	 specifically	
created	 for	 the	 purpose	 of	 dealing	with	 the	 challenge	 of	 global	 climate	 change.	 The	UNFCCC	 being	 a	
United	Nations	organization,	all	members	have	equal	 formal	 rights	so	 that	 issues	of	 struggle	 regarding	
the	 readjustment	 of	 the	 formal	 power	 balance	 within	 the	 organization	 do	 not	 arise.	 In	 recent	 years,	
notably	before	the	Paris	Agreement	of	December	2015,	the	UNFCCC	has	widely	been	regarded	as	unable	





Nevertheless,	due	 to	 the	 threats	of	 climate	change	 for	 survival	of	 small	 island	states	and	conflicts	e.g.	
generated	 through	 migration	 pressure	 within	 and	 between	 countries,	 links	 to	 high	 politics	 such	 as	
security	 policy	 also	 exist.	 From	 this	 perspective,	 the	 case	 of	 international	 climate	 policy	 may	 be	
1	Financial	support	by	the	Swiss	Network	for	International	Studies	(SNIS)	is	gratefully	acknowledged.	
2	For	a	detailed	definition	of	the	different	types	of	organizations,	see	Westerwinter	and	Abbott	(2016:	1).	




will	 first	 consider	 informality	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 actors	 within	 the	 regime	 complex	 (Section	 2),	 and	
second,	 informality	 of	 rules	 and	processes	within	 the	 formal	 structure	of	 the	UNFCCC	 (Section	3).	 The	
analysis	 is	 based	 on	 a	 review	 of	 the	 existing	 literature,	 participant	 observation	 at	 the	 UNFCCC’s	









attempt	 to	 respond	 to	 this	 challenge.	Within	 the	UNFCCC,	 a	 variety	 of	 informal	 rules	 and	 procedures	
have	developed	over	 time,	but	 some	of	 them	were	also	been	challenged	 for	 lack	of	 transparency	and	
equity,	 were	 abandoned	 at	 some	 point,	 and	 have	 now	 been	 replaced	 by	 more	 formal	 or	 alternative	
informal	 procedures.	 While	 some	 informal	 procedures	 were	 clearly	 instrumental	 to	 successful	
agreements,	 others	 are	 widely	 blamed	 for	 having	 contributed	 to	 their	 failure.	 Hence	 the	 appropriate	
choice	 of	 informal	 procedures	 appears	 to	 be	 crucial	 for	 the	 success	 or	 the	 lack	 thereof	 within	 the	
UNFCCC.	 This	 provides	 a	 strong	 role	 and	 responsibility	 for	 the	 host	 country	 government	 of	 each	 COP	
since	 it	 is	 charged	 with	 the	 presidency	 and	 hence	 responsible	 for	 a	 smooth	 organization	 of	 the	
negotiation	process	at	the	COP.	
2. The	rise	of	informal	organizations	and	initiatives
Our	discussion	of	 the	 relevant	actors	builds	on	prior	work	notably	by	Keohane	and	Victor	 (2011),	who	
introduce	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 regime	 complex	 into	 climate	 policy,	 and	 provide	 a	 differentiated	
assessment	of	the	roles	and	objectives	of	different	organizations	created	and	active	within	this	context.	









3its	 effects	 based	 on	 existing	 studies	 and	 our	 additional	 information	 from	 interviews	 and	 participant	
observation	at	the	COPs.		
2.1.	Development	over	time	
International	 climate	 policy	 emerged	 in	 the	 late	 1980s	 and	 was	 institutionalized	 in	 the	 early	 1990s.	
Initially,	 the	 international	 process	 on	 climate	 change	 was	 driven	 by	 single	 governments	 organizing	
conferences	 on	 this	 issue,	 such	 as	 the	 Toronto	 conference	 in	 1988	 in	 Canada,	 and	 the	 Nordwijk	
conference	 1989	 in	 the	 Netherlands.	 The	 first	 FIGO	 built	 around	 climate	 change	 issues	 was	 the	
Intergovernmental	 Panel	 on	 Climate	 Change	 (IPCC)	 set	 up	 in	 1988.	 Its	 reports,	 especially	 the	 First	
Assessment	Report	of	1990,	became	crucial	in	development	of	international	climate	change	governance	




in	UNFCCC	negotiations	 from	the	beginning.	The	World	Bank	especially	played	a	very	proactive	 role	 in	
developing	 pilot	 approaches	 for	 the	market	mechanisms	 under	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol	 as	well	 as	 climate	
finance	 after	 the	 Copenhagen	 Accord.	 The	 OECD	 regularly	 published	 analyses	 aiming	 to	 “educate”	
negotiators	 regarding	 the	 rational	 design	 of	 key	 instruments	 of	 the	 regime.	 The	 same	 applies	 for	 the	







of	 existing	 organizations,	 only	 few	 FIGOs	 were	 newly	 created	 with	 a	 specific	 focus	 on	 international	
climate	policy.	Notable	exceptions	are	the	Global	Environment	Facility	(GEF)	and	the	Green	Climate	Fund	
(GCF)	that	were	established	as	financial	mechanisms	of	the	UNFCCC	in	1991	and	2010	respectively.		
The	 significant	 rise	 of	 formal	 intergovernmental	 organizations	 involved	 in	 the	 climate	 change	 regime	
complex	was	paralleled	by	a	similar	rise	of	 informal	 intergovernmental	organizations	and	transnational	
governance	initiatives	(see	Figure	1).	In	terms	of	sheer	numbers,	notably	the	recent	rise	of	the	number	of	









As	opposed	 to	 FIGOs	most	 of	which	 simply	 started	 to	 orient	 some	of	 their	 activities	 towards	 climate-
relevant	 topics,	 the	overwhelming	majority	of	non-formal	organizations	and	 initiatives	 in	our	database	




beginning.	The	vast	majority	of	 these	 informal	organizations	are	 the	country	negotiation	groups	active	
within	 the	 framework	of	 the	UNFCCC.	 The	 frontrunner	was	 the	Alliance	of	 Small	 Island	 States	 (AOSIS)	
that	 already	 emerged	 in	 1990	 before	 the	 Intergovernmental	 Negotiating	 Committee	 (INC)	 started	 its	
deliberations.	In	the	period	leading	up	to	the	agreement	on	the	Kyoto	Protocol	to	the	UNFCCC	in	1997,	
the	landscape	of	negotiation	groups	was	comparatively	simple.	Market-oriented	industrialized	countries	
that	 were	 somewhat	 reluctant	 to	 address	 climate	 change	 formed	 a	 group	 called	 “JUSSCANZ”	 (the	
acronym	being	derived	from	the	initials	of	the	original	members	Japan,	US,	Switzerland,	Canada	and	New	
Zealand)	 while	 developing	 countries	 negotiated	 through	 the	 G77+China,	 with	 vocal	 subsidiary	 groups	
being	 AOSIS	 and	 the	 Organisation	 of	 the	 Petroleum	 Exporting	 Countries	 (OPEC)	 (Lesolle	 2014).	 After	
Russia	 joined	 JUSSCANZ	 in	 1997,	 the	 group	was	 relabeled	 as	 “Umbrella	Group”.	 Among	 these	 groups,	
only	 JUSSCANZ	 and	 AOSIS	 had	 an	 informal	 character,	 since	 both	 OPEC	 and	 G77+China	 had	 been	
established	with	a	formal	governance	structure	and	administrative	offices	long	before.		
The	 rise	 of	 informal	 negotiation	 groups	 started	 in	 the	 year	 2000,	 which	 saw	 the	 formation	 of	 the	
Environmental	Integrity	Group	(EIG),	consisting	of	Switzerland,	Liechtenstein,	Monaco,	Mexico	and	South	
Korea.	 Until	 today,	 it	 remains	 the	 only	 group	 including	 both	 industrialized	 and	 developing	 countries	
(Darby	2015).	 In	the	following	years,	mainly	triggered	by	the	failure	of	 the	conference	 in	The	Hague	 in	
late	 2000,	 regional	 groups	 started	 to	 emerge,	 such	 as	 the	 African	 Group,	 the	 Grupo	 de	 Iniciativa	
Latinoamericana	(GRILA),	Countries	of	Central	Asia	and	the	Caucasus,	Albania	and	Moldova	(CACAM)	and	
Central	 Group	 11	 (CG	 11)	 for	 Eastern	 European	 countries	 (see	 Royden	 2001	 and	 UNFCCC	 2016b).	
However,	some	of	these	regional	groups	were	rather	 instable	and	only	a	few	have	survived	to	date,	as	
regional	allegiances	have	been	substituted	by	content-related	ones	(see	e.g.	Costantini	et	al.	2016:	136).	
The	 first	of	 those	was	 the	Coalition	 for	Rainforest	Nations	 (CfRN)	 formed	 in	2005	which	 is	 fighting	 for	
incentives	 to	 prevent	 emissions	 from	 forest	 destruction	 (CfRN	 2016).	 This	 group	 has	 even	 set	 up	 a	
Secretariat,	thus	becoming	an	FIGO.		
The	 Copenhagen	 Conference	 of	 2009	 and	 its	 aftermath	 led	 to	 an	 open	 split	 of	 G77+China	 in	 various	
groups	that	often	overlap.	 In	the	run-up	to	the	conference	the	 large	emerging	economies	Brazil,	South	
Africa,	India	and	China	formed	the	BASIC	group.	After	the	failure	of	Copenhagen,	the	socialist	countries	
from	 Latin	 America	 and	 the	 Caribbean	 set	 up	 the	 Bolivarian	 Alliance	 for	 the	 Peoples	 of	 Our	 America	
(ALBA).	The	year	2012	saw	the	birth	of	the	progressive	group	“Independent	Alliance	of	Latin	America	and	
the	Caribbean”	(AILAC)	which	then	triggered	the	“Like-Minded	Developing	Countries	on	Climate	Change”	
(LMDC)	 bringing	 together	 developing	 countries	 from	 all	 continents	 reluctant	 to	 engage	 in	 strong	
mitigation	policy.	Since	Copenhagen,	 the	Least	Developed	Countries	have	 formed	a	negotiation	group,	
too.	 The	 Paris	 Conference	 saw	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 “High	 Ambition	 Coalition”	 including	 over	 100	
countries	and	unlikely	to	 last	due	to	the	vast	variation	of	preferences	among	its	members.	Overall,	the	
landscape	of	 country	 negotiation	 groups	 has	moved	 from	 few,	mutually	 exclusive	 groups	with	 a	 large	
membership	to	a	plethora	of	groups	with	overlapping	membership	(see	Figure	3).	For	further	details	on	



























part	 of	 the	 climate	 change	 regime	 complex.	 These	 include	 the	 Group	 of	 Eight	 (G8),	 G8+5	 (i.e.,	 G8	 in	
combination	with	Brazil,	China,	India,	Mexico	and	South	Africa),	the	Group	of	Twenty	(G20),	and	the	Major	






observe	 an	 irregular	 growth	 trend.	 There	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 steepening	 of	 the	 increase	 with	 the	 Kyoto	
Protocol’s	entry	into	force	in	2005,	and	a	flattening	after	the	Copenhagen	conference	in	2009	followed	by	a	
further	upward	jump	shortly	before	the	conference	in	Paris	in	2015.	These	shifts	concern	different	types	of	
TGIs:	 The	 TGIs	 created	 just	 after	 the	 Kyoto	 Protocol	 like	 the	 Prototype	 Carbon	 Fund	 and	 various	 similar	
carbon	 funds	 managed	 by	 the	 World	 Bank	 focus	 on	 the	 market	 mechanisms	 defined	 under	 the	 Kyoto	









the	 time	 after	 2012	 and	 thus	 significantly	 reduced	 the	 development	 of	 this	 type	 of	 TGIs.	 The	 final	major	
increase	 of	 TGIs	 in	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	 Paris	 Conference	 in	 2015	 is	mostly	 due	 to	 new	networks	with	 little	
emphasis	 on	 concrete	 climate	 change	 mitigation	 measures,	 primarily	 signaling	 the	 participating	 actors’	
willingness	to	avoid	a	total	standstill	of	the	international	negotiation	process	(Michaelowa	and	Michaelowa	
2016b).	 Overall,	 among	 the	 109	 climate-related	 TGIs	 in	 our	 dataset	 the	 majority	 of	 68%	 focuses	 on	
networking,	20%	are	standards,	8%	are	carbon	funds,	4%	relate	to	technology	development,	and	5%	have	no	
mitigation	related	purpose,	but	purely	focus	on	adaptation	(Michaelowa	and	Michaelowa	2016b).	
While	 the	 increase	 in	 TGI	numbers	 is	 impressive,	 the	above	categorization	may	already	 suggest	 that	 their	
relevance	for	actual	international	climate	policy	varies	considerably.	When	examining	organizational	design	
features	ensuring	that	TGI	members	effectively	take	action	for	emissions	reductions,	we	see	that,	in	fact,	the	
bulk	 of	 initiatives	 cannot	 be	 expected	 to	 induce	 significant	 climate	 change	 mitigation:	 Only	 11%	 of	 the	
initiatives	 formulate	 any	 mitigation	 target,	 and	 only	 13%	 provide	 some	 kind	 of	 financial	 incentives	 for	
mitigation	activities	of	their	members.	46%	of	the	initiatives	foresee	some	kind	of	monitoring,	reporting	and	
verification	(MRV),	but	only	27%	define	a	baseline	against	which	to	measure	potential	change.	Almost	half	of	
the	 initiatives	do	not	 show	any	of	 these	provisions	 (see	Annex	2,	Table	A1,	 last	 row,	and	Michaelowa	and	
Michaelowa	2016b,	Appendix	Table	A1).	






of	 developing	 country	 actors	 alone,	 almost	 40%	 have	 members	 only	 from	 industrialized	 countries.	 In	
addition,	only	in	three	out	of	109	cases,	the	founding	country	(i.e.	the	home	country	of	the	founding	actor	or	
the	country	in	which	the	foundation	took	place)	is	not	an	OECD	country.	These	are	the	“Clean	Air	Initiative”	
founded	 in	 the	 Philippines	 in	 2001,	 “Socialcarbon”	 founded	 in	 Brazil	 in	 2008,	 and	 the	 “Panda	 Standard”	
founded	 in	China	 in	2009.	All	of	them	focus	on	MRV,	the	Chinese	one	additionally	requires	a	baseline,	but	




initiatives	 in	 Bulkeley	 et	 al.	 (2012).	 They	 are	 further	 reinforced	 by	 the	 finding	 that	 there	 is	 no	 positive	
correlation	(in	fact,	no	significant	correlation	at	all)	between	the	share	of	developing	country	actors	and	the	





that	 the	 dynamics	 of	 the	UNFCCC	process	 itself	 has	 been	driving	 the	 development	 of	 these	 organizations	
over	 time.	 This	 is	 most	 obvious	 for	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 IIGOs	 established	 as	 negotiation	 groups	 when	
countries	 noticed	 that	 given	 the	 development	 of	 the	 negotiations,	 coalitions	 with	 new	 partners	 would	
further	 their	 interests.	While	external	 to	 the	negotiations,	 TGIs	have	also	been	 responsive	 to	 the	UNFCCC	
process.	 The	 different	 typologies	 discussed	 above	 reflect	 their	 different	 purposes,	 namely	 sharing	
information	(networks),	developing	and	implementing	cost-effective	means	to	deal	with	upcoming	or	newly	
introduced	requirements	(carbon	funds,	technology	development	initiatives),	lobbying	in	order	to	influence	
the	 negotiation	 outcomes	 (networks),	 improving	 the	 members’	 public	 image	 and	 enhancing	 their	
competitiveness	through	transparency	about	their	mitigation	action	(networks,	standards).	They	all	relate	in	
some	way	or	the	other	to	the	UNFCCC	process	and	their	prevalence	among	newly	created	initiatives	directly	
corresponds	 to	 the	 signals	 provided	 there.	 Thus	 TGIs	 with	 a	 clear	 focus	 on	 concrete	 mitigation	 action	










to	 galvanize	 and	 catalyze	 climate	 action.	 He	 has	 asked	 these	 leaders	 to	 bring	 bold	 announcements	 and	
actions	to	the	Summit	that	will	reduce	emissions”	(United	Nations	2014).	His	intervention	was	a	key	feature	
of	this	phase	and	triggered	the	strong	increase	in	TGIs	in	2014.	







by	placing	the	UNFCCC	and	as	well	as	 IIGOs	 in	 form	of	negotiation	groups	at	 the	core,	a	number	of	highly	
influential	FIGOs	like	the	World	Bank	and	negotiation	fora	like	G8,	G20	and	the	MEF	as	well	as	the	few	new	
FIGOs	created	within	 the	negotiation	process	 (GEF	and	GCF)	 in	 the	second	ring,	and	other	FIGOs	 trying	 to	
influence	 the	 negotiations	 and/or	 to	 understand	which	 part	 of	 the	 agreement	 could	 be	 relevant	 for	 their	
own	mandate	along	with	TGIs	in	a	third	ring.	This	third	and	most	peripheral	ring	had	the	greatest	part	in	the	
strong	 rise	 of	 the	 number	 of	 organizations	 within	 the	 regime	 complex.	 Environmental	 NGOs,	 business	




Negotiation	 groups	 are	 directly	 involved	 in	 rulemaking	 and	 thus	 highly	 influential	 within	 the	 UNFCCC	
process.	 Some	 groups	 have	 been	 particularly	 successful	 in	 this	 respect.	 AOSIS	 for	 instance,	 managed	 to	
bundle	 the	 preferences	 of	 the	 vulnerable	 small	 island	 states	 at	 an	 early	 point	 in	 time	 and	 to	 jointly	
demonstrate	the	dramatic	consequences	of	climate	change.	Given	the	salience	the	issue	had	for	them,	they	
were	granted	a	seat	 in	certain	UNFCCC	committees,	 in	which	given	their	size	and	hard	power,	 they	would	
usually	not	have	been	permitted	to	send	a	delegate	(Benwell	2016:	70,	Betzold	et	al.	2012:	594).	At	the	other	
end	of	 the	developing	country	 spectrum,	BASIC	was	also	quite	 successful.	The	common	 interests	of	BASIC	




countries,	 notably	 India	 and	 China	 were	 often	 presented	 as	 spoilers	 of	 the	 negotiation	 process	 (see	 e.g.	




Whether	 the	rise	of	negotiation	groups	and	their	substantial	 influence	on	the	negotiations	 is	advancing	or	
hindering	 a	 global	 effort	 towards	 climate	 change	 mitigation	 obviously	 depends	 on	 the	 balance	 between	




each	 country	 participates	 in	 away	 consistent	 with	 its	 (self-perceived)	 capacities	 (see	 Michaelowa	 and	
Michaelowa	2015).	The	eventual	climate	change	mitigation	achieved	by	this	approach	will	depend	on	how	
countries’	 ambitions	 evolve	 over	 time.	 The	 current	 engagements	 presented	 in	 the	 form	 of	 each	 party’s	
‘Nationally	 determined	 contribution’)	 leave	 a	 substantial	 gap	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 simultaneously	 agreed	
objective	to	keep	global	temperature	rise	“well	below	2°C”	(UNFCCC	2015).		
As	opposed	to	IIGOs,	to	date,	only	few	TGIs	have	been	able	to	directly	influence	rulemaking	at	the	UNFCCC.	
This	 has	 only	 been	 the	 case	 when	 TGIs	 combined	 highly	 reputed	 think	 tanks	 with	 governments	 and	 key	





such	 exceptional	 cases,	 TGIs	 have	 had	 some	 indirect	 effects	 through	 standard	 setting,	 lobbying,	 and	
influencing	 public	 opinion	 in	 the	members’	 countries	 of	 origin.	 Just	 as	 for	 the	 IIGOs	 discussed	 above,	 the	




been	 very	 successful	 at	 supporting	 the	 implementation	of	 the	Kyoto	Protocol	 and	 could	 become	 similarly	
relevant	for	the	implementation	of	the	Paris	Agreement.		
Overall,	 our	 main	 conclusion	 is	 that	 the	 informal	 organizations	 and	 initiatives	 involved	 in	 international	
climate	politics	generally	did	not	play	an	independent	role	with	respect	to	the	core	objective	of	the	climate	
change	 regime	 to	 mitigate	 climate	 change,	 but	 rather	 worked	 either	 in	 response	 to	 outcomes	 from	 the	
UNFCCC	 or	 tried	 to	 influence	 these	 outcomes	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 Despite	 the	 substantial	 increase	 in	 the	
number	of	organizations	and	initiatives	populating	the	climate	change	regime	complex,	the	UNFCCC	clearly	




Given	 the	 central	 role	of	 the	UNFCCC,	we	will	 now	examine	how	 informality	has	 affected	 the	negotiation	
outcomes	 within	 this	 international	 regime.	 In	 this	 context,	 we	 will	 consider	 the	 informality	 of	 rules	 and	
procedures	and	how	they	evolved	over	time.	The	general	importance	of	rules	and	procedures,	both	formal	
and	 informal,	has	been	discussed	 in	detail	 in	the	extant	 literature,	notably	by	Yamin	and	Depledge	(2004),	









relaxation	 of	 formal	 rules	 and	 regulations	 (see	 also	 Yamin	 and	 Depledge	 2004).	 She	 also	 distinguishes	
between	a	number	of	arenas	of	different	degree	of	 informality	that	provide	opportunities	for	delegates	to	
discuss	 more	 freely	 (Depledge	 2005:	 108ff.).	 Their	 range	 covers	 everything	 between	 informal	 plenary	
meetings	 that	 only	 differ	 from	 formal	 plenaries	 by	 a	 corresponding	 declaration	 by	 the	 President	 of	 the	
conference,	 to	 informal	 consultations	 between	 the	 President	 and	 selected	 countries	 or	 broader	 but	 still	
highly	informal	working	groups	on	specific	technical	issues.	Due	to	their	strong	degree	of	informality,	some	














that	nobody	was	able	 to	keep	 track	 (Bodansky	2016),	 indeed	 the	French	Presidency	virtually	had	bilateral	
last-minute	talks	with	all	individual	groups	(Brun	2016:	120).	This	is	what	Depledge	(2005:	131)	refers	to	as	
“shuttle	diplomacy”.	












informal	 negotiation	 process	 throughout	 the	 preceding	 year	 meeting	 individual	 groups	 and	 member	
countries.	Their	intensity	and	structure	also	varied	over	time.		
When	 it	 comes	 to	 the	 interpretation	 of	 rules,	 informality	 can	 become	 similarly	 controversial.	 A	matter	 in	
case	is	the	interpretation	of	the	consensus	principle	for	the	final	agreement.	The	consensus	principle	itself	is	
not	 formally	 anchored	 in	 the	 Convention,	 but	 results	 from	 the	 lack	 of	 agreement	 on	 specific	 voting	
provisions	 (Monheim	2015:	31).	Ever	since	the	agreement	to	the	Kyoto	Protocol	 in	1997,	 there	have	been	
instances	 where	 a	 consensus	 was	 declared	 despite	 disagreement	 by	 some	 of	 the	 parties.	 At	 Kyoto,	 the	
President	 read	 out	 the	 controversial	 paragraph	 and	 asked	whether	 there	were	 any	 objections.	 But	when	
India,	China	and	the	EU	raised	their	flags,	he	quickly	went	on	with	the	next	paragraph.	There	were	no	other	
objections.	Had	anyone	complained	at	this	point,	he	would	have	been	held	responsible	for	the	failure	of	the	
negotiations.	 So	 the	 agreement	 passed	 (Grubb	 et	 al.	 1999:	 96).	 In	 other	 instances,	 parties	 did	 formally	
complain.	In	Geneva	1996	and	in	Copenhagen	2009	this	led	to	the	parties’	decision	to	merely	“take	note	of”	
rather	 than	 to	 agree	 upon	 the	 final	 document.	 One	 year	 after	 Copenhagen	 at	 the	 Cancun	 conference,	








happened	 again	 one	 year	 later	 in	 Doha	 against	 the	 explicit	 objection	 by	 Russia,	 Ukraine	 and	 Belarus	
(Rajamani	2016:	212).	After	Cancun,	the	press	reported	that	Bolivia	might	consider	challenging	the	Cancun	
decision	at	 the	 International	Court	of	 Justice,	but	 this	would	have	had	 little	chance	of	 success	 (Werksman	
2010).	And	in	the	following	year,	despite	the	blunt	ignorance	of	the	objection	of	a	major	power	like	Russia,	
the	negotiation	process	continued	based	on	the	‘agreement’	at	Doha.	However,	to	retaliate,	Russia	blocked	




However,	 in	 Paris,	 the	 agreement	was	 at	 risk	 just	 before	 its	 conclusion,	 due	 to	 an	 error	 in	 the	 draft	 that	
stated	 “shall”	 instead	 of	 “should”	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 increasing	 ambition	 of	 emission	 reductions	 by	 the	
United	States.	 Legally,	 this	would	have	 turned	a	 recommendation	 into	an	obligation.	The	 issue	was	highly	
critical	 as	 the	 new	 formulation	would	 have	 implied	 that	 President	 Obama	 could	 not	 himself	 approve	 the	













and	 the	 Presidencies	 of	 subsequent	 conferences	 had	 to	 make	 a	 substantial	 effort	 to	 restore	 some	 trust	








2011.	 In	 principle	 every	 country	 could	 still	 send	 a	 minister,	 but	 the	 overall	 number	 of	 participants	 was	
constraint	 to	 about	 40	 people	who	 could	 be	 seated	 around	 a	 square	 table.	 Ever	 since,	 this	 approach	 has	
been	 applied	 as	 governments	 have	 been	 able	 to	 informally	 agree	which	ministers	 should	 take	 the	 scarce	
seats	at	the	table.	Especially	if	accompanied	by	a	wise	information	policy	by	the	president	where	results	of	






the	 Indaba	 are	 communicated	 to	 the	 formal	 plenary	 every	 day,	 the	 approach	 was	 seen	 as	 sufficiently	
inclusive	to	allow	an	efficient	negotiation.	Laurent	Fabius	very	skillfully	applied	this	approach	during	the	Paris	
Conference	to	achieve	a	constructive	mix	of	informality	and	transparency	(South	Africa	2015).	
When	observing	 the	 increase	and	 then	 fall	 in	 informality,	 one	 could	 think	of	 a	 formality-informality	 cycle.	
The	cycle	is	based	on	an	experimental	testing	of	the	extent	to	which	rules	and	procedures	can	be	rendered	
more	flexible	and	hence	efficient,	but	with	the	risk	of	sudden	fallback	and	heavy	criticism.	Finding	acceptable	
and	 efficient	 procedural	 innovation	 is	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 a	 matter	 of	 the	 creativity	 and	 sensitivity	 of	 the	
presidency.		
Formality-informality	cycles	also	occur	without	any	crisis	or	criticism,	 in	 the	context	of	 the	 introduction	of	
new	 issues	 to	 be	 explored.	 An	 instructive	 example	 is	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	market	mechanisms	 of	 the	
Kyoto	Protocol,	the	Clean	Development	Mechanism	(CDM)	and	Joint	Implementation	(JI).	They	emerged	as	a	
real	 surprise	 during	 the	 Kyoto	 Conference	 of	 1997	 (Grubb	 et	 al.	 1999:	 97ff.),	 but	 a	 long	 discussion	 had	
preceded	 this	 decision.	 After	 the	Berlin	 Conference	of	 1995	had	 agreed	 to	 test	market-based	 approaches	
through	a	pilot	phase	of	“Activities	Implemented	Jointly”	(AIJ),	a	number	of	countries	and	private	actors	had	
started	 to	 experiment	with	mitigation	 projects.	While	 formally	 such	 projects	 could	 not	 generate	 emission	
credits,	the	undeclared	aim	of	the	pioneers	was	to	eventually	achieve	this,	and	they	did	so	in	Kyoto.	As	these	
instruments	were	 highly	 innovative,	 the	 subsequent	 setting	 of	 rules	was	 challenging	 and	 involved	 varying	
degrees	of	informality.	
The	World	Bank	especially	 felt	 that	 it	was	well	placed	to	play	a	key	role	 in	defining	 the	rules	of	 the	Kyoto	
Mechanisms.	 Therefore,	 in	 1999	 it	 set	 up	 the	 “Prototype	 Carbon	 Fund”	 (PCF)	 open	 for	 government	 and	
private	subscriptions	(Michaelowa	and	Michaelowa	2011:	263).	At	the	same	time,	private	sector	players	set	
up	 the	 International	 Emissions	 Trading	 Association	 (IETA)	 as	 a	 lobby	 group	 to	 influence	 design	 of	 the	
mechanisms.	The	formal	negotiations	on	the	rules	for	CDM	and	JI	were	only	dragging	on	slowly.		
The	Marrakech	 Conference	 in	 2001	 then	 formally	 agreed	 on	 a	 set	 of	 rules	 for	 CDM	 and	 JI	 as	well	 as	 the	
institutions	overseeing	these	mechanisms	(CDM	Executive	Board	and	JI	Supervisory	Committee).	However,	
their	 detailed	 interpretation,	 for	 example	 regarding	 the	 methodologies	 for	 defining	 project	 baselines,	
remained	 unclear.	 Building	 on	 the	 first	 lessons	 from	 the	 PCF,	 the	World	 Bank	 engaged	with	 a	 number	 of	
governments	to	set	up	specific	funds	for	CDM	and	JI	investments,	e.g.	with	the	Netherlands,	Spain	and	Italy	
(Michaelowa	 and	 Michaelowa	 2011:	 263).	 The	 World	 Bank	 was	 quite	 clear	 that	 it	 expected	 the	 specific	
baseline	and	monitoring	methodologies	to	be	those	that	it	had	developed	for	its	funds.	The	CDM	Executive	
Board	 did,	 however,	 not	 accept	 this	 reasoning	 and	 rejected	 several	 of	 the	 World	 Bank’s	 methodology	
proposals	(Michaelowa	and	Michaelowa	2016a).	












has	 developed	 an	 increasingly	 elaborate	 set	 of	 principles	 for	 prioritizing	 side	 event	 applications.	 These	
incentivized	collaboration	between	governments	and	NGOs.	For	the	last	years,	a	significant	number	of	side	
events	 have	 been	 held	 regarding	 the	 design	 of	 new	 market	 mechanisms,	 and	 negotiation	 positions	 of	
governments	have	been	influenced	by	these	events.	








The	 above	 discussion	 shows	 that	 the	 use	 of	 informal	 rules	 and	 procedures	 can	 have	 both	 positive	 and	
negative	effects,	depending	on	 the	right	balance	 in	 response	 to	participants’	willingness	 to	either	proceed	
fast	 or	 first	 remove	 remaining	 stumbling	 blocks,	 to	 the	 general	 atmosphere	 of	 trust	 or	 mistrust,	 to	 the	
specific	topic	at	stake	and	to	the	question	how	ripe	it	is	for	final	decision.	The	judgement	of	which	informal	
rules	 and	procedures	 are	 ‘good’	or	 ‘bad’	 cannot	be	made	 in	 general	 terms	 as	 it	 depends	on	 the	 concrete	
situation.	 Bodansky	 (2016)	 for	 instance	 argues	 that	 if	 countries	 had	 been	 as	 familiar	with	 the	 bottom-up	
system	of	nationally	determined	contributions	as	they	are	now,	the	conference	in	Copenhagen	might	already	
have	 led	 to	an	agreement.	The	 judgement	of	whether	a	 specific	approach	or	 interpretation	 is	appropriate	
and	 will	 be	 accepted	 by	 the	 parties	 lies	 in	 the	 responsibility	 of	 the	 Presidency.	 This	 implies	 that	 the	
diplomatic	skills	and	the	management	capacity	of	the	President	and	his	or	her	team	have	a	major	impact	on	




The	 number	 of	 informal	 organizations	 involved	 in	 international	 climate	 politics	 has	 significantly	 increased	
over	 time.	 They	 generally	 fulfil	 a	 contributing	 role	 to	 the	 UNFCCC	 process,	 like	 the	 country	 negotiation	
groups	and	groups	set	up	to	engage	in	operationalization	of	the	Kyoto	Mechanisms.	Only	in	times	when	the	
UNFCCC	process	had	stalled,	 some	of	 them	tried	 to	serve	as	alternative.	This	was	particularly	 the	case	 for	
organizations	set	up	in	the	context	of	the	Ban	Ki	Moon	Summit	of	2014.	But	once	the	UNFCCC	process	came	
back	 on	 track	 through	 the	 Paris	 Agreement,	 these	 institutions	 have	 acknowledged	 the	 primacy	 of	 the	
UNFCCC.	
Due	 to	 the	 need	 for	 consensus,	 the	 UNFCCC	 process	 has	 developed	 a	 number	 of	 informal	 processes	 to	
remain	 operational.	 Some	 of	 these	 processes	 have	 been	more	 successful	 than	 others—e.g.	 the	 “Indaba”	
approach	 pioneered	 by	 South	 Africa	 at	 the	 Durban	 conference,	 which	 served	 as	 a	 model	 for	 the	 French	
approach	in	Paris	2015.	The	Copenhagen	conference	of	2009	had	been	a	high	profile	case	of	failure	due	to	
informal	 procedures	 seen	 as	 exclusionary	by	 relevant	 parties.	Given	 the	 key	 role	of	 the	host	 country	of	 a	






which	 was	 stretched	 considerably	 in	 2010	 and	 2012.	 Especially	 in	 the	 latter	 case,	 where	 Russia	 was	
overridden,	the	limitations	of	this	approach	became	apparent.	
In	a	number	of	 cases,	 for	example	 in	 the	context	of	market	mechanisms,	a	 formality-informality	 cycle	has	
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             Organization 
 
Name and function of person interviewed 
 
International Union for Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN) 
 
Patrick Andrew Wylie 
(Senior REDD+ Advisor / Climate Change Mitigation 
Policy Officer) 
 
European Patent Office (EPO) 
Dr. Ilja Rudyck 
(Senior Economist) 
 





Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) 
Dr. Martin Frick 
(Director of Climate, Energy and Tenure Division) 
 




(Associate Environment Officer) 
 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) 
Stefan Micallef 
(Director, Marine Environment Division) 
 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
Jessika Berns 
(Junior Technical Officer) 
 
 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and 





United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) 
Verania Chao Rebolledo 













0	 1	 2	 3	 4	 Total	
Zero	 14	 7	 6	 10	 1	 38	
	
(37%)	 (18%)	 (16%)	 (26%)	 (3%)	 (100%)	
Low	 13	 9	 4	 1	 0	 27	
	
(48%)	 (33%)	 (15%)	 (4%)	 (0%)	 (100%)	
medium	 13	 6	 2	 0	 0	 21	
	
(62%)	 (29%)	 (10%)	 (0%)	 (0%)	 (100%)	
High	 10	 5	 4	 3	 0	 22	
	
(45%)	 (23%)	 (18%)	 (14%)	 (0%)	 (100%)	
Only	 1	 0	 0	 0	 0	 1	
	
(100%)	 (0%)	 (0%)	 (0%)	 (0%)	 (100%)	
Total	 51	 27	 16	 14	 1	 109	
	
(47%)	 (25%)	 (15%)	 (13%)	 (1%)	 (100%)	
Notes:	Numbers	in	brackets	refer	to	row	percentages.	The	categories	for	the	share	(s)	of	non-Annex	I	membership	are:		
‘only’:	s=100%,	‘high’:	100%>s>50%,	‘medium’:	50%≥s>25%,	‘low’:	25%≥s>0%,	‘zero’:	s=0%.	The	association	between	the	two		
variables	is	insignificant	(Cramer’s	V	=	0.20,	p-value	=	0.40).	
Design	criteria	as	defined	in	Michaelowa	and	Michaelowa	(2016)	include	the	existence	of	1)	a	mitigation	target,	2)	financial	incentives,		
3)	a	clearly	defined	baseline,	and	4)	some	mechanism	for	MRV.	
	
